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Abstract
In a  recent  article,  José  Luis  Bermúdez challenged David Lewis’s  argument  about 
Newcomb’s problem (NP) and the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) being the same. I show 
briefly  that  Bermúdez’s  counterargument  is  not  sound  and  that  Lewis’s  original 
position is correct.
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According to Bermúdez’s (2013) clear reconstruction of Lewis’s argument (1979), the 
following is a fundamental assumption in NP (using Bermúdez’s numeration):
(3*) I will receive $1,000,000 ↔ It is predicted that I do not take my $1,000 
In a modified version of the PD, which involves exchanging years of prison for  
bail payments, the following is a fundamental assumption:
(3**) I will receive $1,000,000 ↔ you do not take your $1,000. 
Under a general notion of predictive processes, the following assumption permits 
interpreting both situations as the same general problem:
2(A) It is predicted that I do not take my $1,000 ↔ you do not take your $1,000. 
The first step in Bermúdez’s counterargument is the claim that since the epistemic 
situation  of  the  players  is  a  special  feature  of  NP,  assumption  (A)  should  be 
reformulated under a high confidence operator (Cp) as follows:
(5) Cp (It is predicted that I do not take my $1,000 ↔ you do not take your $1,000)
This seems to be correct for both NP and the PD. But Bermúdez’s second step is 
to show that holding (5) in a problem already characterised as a PD implies that such a 
problem is not a PD. He argues that to believe in (5), the agent must have a low degree 
of belief in the following bi-conditionals:
(6) I take my $1,000 ↔ you do not take your $1,000
(7) I do not take my $1,000 ↔ you take your $1,000
According to Bermúdez, this would imply that Lewis’s argument is self-defeating, 
since the description of the PD would leave only two scenarios open in the extreme 
case. It seems that if one attributes a low degree of belief to claims (6) and (7), one 
should also hold the following:
(8) I take my $1,000 ↔ you take your $1,000
(9) I do not take my $1,000 ↔ you do not take your $1,000
Nevertheless, (8) or an epistemic version thereof does not follow from (A), nor  
from its epistemic formulation (5). That the actions of an agent’s replica show a way of  
predicting the agent’s actions does not imply that his actions are the same as those of  
his replica—i.e. that they represent a reliable prediction. Lewis’s (1979: 238) already 
warned of  this,  explaining that  some replicas  have more predictive power  than do 
others.  The average degree of belief of claims like (8) and (9) should exceed a low 
standard of reliability (about 0.5005) if the problem is a genuine disagreement about  
rationality. (Lewis uses conditional  probabilities instead of  biconditionals,  but  such 
details  must  not  be  considered  here.)  Thus,  Bermúdez  is  right  in  saying  that  an 
assumption like (8) would imply that the game considered as both a NP and a PD is not  
really a PD, but he is wrong in saying that such an assumption follows from (5) or 
from anything in  Lewis’s  argument.  The problem can still  be  considered a  PD by 
maintaining (5)  and without  having to  maintain (8).  It  should be also noticed that 
Lewis’s  argument  is  not  indirectly self-defeating  either,  because  the  confidence 
operator is not more relevant to the PD than it is in NP. 
Now suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the agent is actually committed, 
as Bermúdez says, to have a high degree of belief in a claim like (8). The problem 
considered would not be a NP either, which is another reason why Bermúdez’s intent 
of separating NP and the PD fails. Since, according to assumption (A) in the general  
3problem, the other prisoner’s action is interpreted as a predictive process, one could 
state the following in NP:
(8*)  I take my $1,000 ↔ It is predicted that I take my $1,000
This would also transform the problem into a situation that lacks the outcome 
scenarios that make NP so puzzling. Of course, it would be true only in the extreme 
situation, which is the case neither for a traditional formulation of the NP nor for any 
real-life decision problem.
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